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Abstract 
We consider the cost of meeting emissions reduction targets consistent with a G8 proposal of a 50 
percent global reduction in emissions by 2050, and an Obama Administration proposal of an 80 
percent reduction over this period. We apply the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis 
(EPPA), modeling these two policy scenarios if met by applying a national cap-and-trade system, and 
compare results with an earlier EPPA analysis of reductions of this stringency. We also test results to 
alternative assumptions about program coverage, banking behavior, and cost of technology in the 
electric power sector. Two main messages emerge from the exercise. First, technology uncertainties 
have a huge effect on the generation mix but only a moderate effect on the emissions price and 
welfare cost of achieving the assumed targets. Measured in terms of changes in economic welfare, the 
economic cost of 80 percent reduction by 2050 is in the range of 2 to 3% by 2050, with CO2 prices 
between $48 and $67 in 2015 rising to between $190 and $266 by 2050. Second, implementation 
matters. When an idealized economy-wide cap-and-trade is replaced by coverage omitting some 
sectors, or if the credibility of long-term target is weak (limiting banking behavior) prices and welfare 
costs change substantially.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Several Congressional proposals for mitigating U.S. greenhouse gases have been put forth in 
recent years.  Paltsev et al. (2008) analyzed the main proposals for cap-and-trade systems and 
Metcalf et al. (2008) did the same for CO2 taxes.  Paltsev et al. (2008) developed three paths of 
emissions control spanning the range of Congressional proposals, summarized in terms of the 
number of allowances that would be issued between 2012 and 2050, defined in terms of billions 
of metric tons (bmt) of CO2 equivalent (CO2-e). The three cases—287, 203, and 167 bmt—were 
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associated with allowance allocation schemes that, respectively, yielded constant emissions at 
2008 levels or linearly reduced them to 50% and 80% below 2008 emissions by 2050. These 
target reductions, particularly those with deeper cuts, remain relevant to current policy 
discussions, but much has changed since our earlier work was completed. Here we reconsider 
these reduction targets using the same version of the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis 
(EPPA) model used by Patsev et al. (2008), but updating the underlying economic, technology, 
and policy assumptions to better reflect the current economic conditions and technology cost 
expectations.  
In terms of economic outlook, the prospects for economic growth have worsened, especially 
in the short term, and even the long-term growth prospects considered reasonable a few years 
ago now seem optimistic.  Lower economic activity means fewer emissions, and so less 
abatement will be needed to meet specific quantitative targets.   
On the technology front, the prospects for carbon capture and storage (CCS) have worsened: 
progress in commercial demonstration has been slow, and the full cost of the technology has 
become clearer as these efforts have proceeded.  As a result, costs are likely much higher than 
those drawn from earlier engineering studies and applied in our previous analysis. The prospects 
for nuclear power have changed as well.  There are now some concrete proposals within the U.S. 
to build new plants, even though the technology remains an inexpensive option. In the Paltsev et 
al. (2008) analysis, the core cases severely limited nuclear growth beyond its existing capacity 
based on anticipated regulatory and siting limitations. U.S. nuclear expansion now appears more 
likely, but the costs of these plants are now seen to be more expensive than their representation 
in the earlier work. 
Renewables, especially wind, have been expanding at a high rate, albeit from a very small 
base, and are looking more viable than assumed earlier. Casual observation of the rapid growth 
rates might suggest these sources are now competitive with conventional generation. However, 
that evidence does not reveal the full cost of wind or solar at a large scale. Current investment 
has been spurred by significant tax incentives and subsidies. While representing the after tax-
incentive cost in the EPPA model might produce an accurate portrayal of current market 
penetration, simply lowering the cost to reflect the subsidies would underestimate the hidden 
costs to taxpayers and utility customers. Also, one motivation for these subsidies is to 
demonstrate the technology, and it is reasonable to assume they will be phased out once the 
technology is demonstrated.  Expansion of wind or solar to larger shares of generation will also 
require more storage or redundant capacity to accommodate their intermittency, and an increase 
in the transmission network to bring this dispersed energy source to demand areas. The submodel 
of these sources has been revised to better capture these various influences.1 
                                                 
1 Energy prices have also swung widely since the time of our earlier analysis of these proposals.  We do not consider 
these effects.  The previous work by Paltsev et al. (2008) showed a slower and gradual rise in the oil price, and 
did not reproduce the recent high prices, suggesting that the run-up was not supportable on long-term 
fundamentals. The collapse of oil prices may provide some support for that interpretation. Furthermore, the 
recent volatility provides little information of use in calibrating a model that solves for five-year periods. 
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While the previous reduction targets examined by Paltsev et al. (2008) remain relevant the 
policy details have evolved.  Nearly all proposals seek to achieve major cuts in greenhouse gas 
emissions, so the 287 bmt case (just holding emissions constant) is not of much relevance to 
current discussions.  The overall nationwide targets now being discussed remain within the 167 
to 203 bmt range, however, with more emphasis on targets consistent with the 167 bmt case.  
Also, as these proposals have been reworked several subtle changes have been introduced that 
can affect the overall cost.  For example, while it has generally been recognized that any actual 
cap-and-trade system is likely to leave out some emissions sources, the past proposals tended to 
proportionately scale allowance allocations for covered sectors, allowing the uncapped sectors to 
avoid restriction and possibly to grow. As a result the nominal national-level cap would be 
exceeded.  Given increased concerns about the risk of climate change there is now interest in 
more than proportionately reducing allowances to capped sectors to make up for lack of control 
in the uncapped sectors. There is also increased interest in coupling a cap-and-trade system with 
regulatory policies such as a renewable portfolio standard that would give an assured boost to a 
subset of technologies.  
Also the relationship of long-term targets to near-term actions and policy costs is a growing 
issue. Our earlier work showed that targets which are tightened over time tended to stimulate 
banking of allowances in the near term.  As a result, near term targets were more than met and 
the near term CO2-e prices rose above the level one might expect given the relatively smaller 
reductions required in the early years. The reason to set longer term targets is to provide clear 
direction on where emitters need to be in the future and thereby provide incentives for 
investment in aggressive mitigation options. However, policy proposals that specify an ambitious 
long-run goal but only provide allowances on a much shorter rolling time scale, and that show 
concern about cost containment, may signal to emitters that the long-term target is only an 
aspiration, and is easily changed. Even forward-looking firms may discount ambitious distant 
goals as not credible. In that case the incentive to bank allowances is much reduced, with 
substantial implications for short-term effort and cost. 
We investigate these issues, structuring our paper in the following way.  In Section 2 we 
briefly describe the EPPA model and focus on the specific updates we have made for this 
analysis.  Section 3 provides a comparison of the new results for the three cases—287, 203, and 
167 bmt—with our previous estimates.  In Section 4 we focus on the 167 bmt case and examine 
how, given a national target, details of implementation or different expectations about 
technology can lead to significant differences in costs and the success of different technologies.  
In particular we focus, in turn, on (1) shortening the banking time horizon to 2030, which is 
consistent with the assumption that the 2050 target is not fully credible, (2) excluding hard-to-
monitor sectors from the cap while tightening the constraint on the capped sectors to make up for 
these emissions, and (3) effects of different assumptions about the cost of CCS, nuclear and 
renewables.  In terms of technology alternatives we focus on results for the electricity sector.  
Other details on economy-wide emissions and other economic indicators are provided in the on-
line Appendix. We conclude in Section 5. 
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2. THE EMISSIONS PREDICTION AND POLICY ANALYSIS (EPPA) MODEL 
The standard version of the EPPA model (Table 1) is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive-
dynamic representation of the global economy (Paltsev et al., 2005).2  The recursive solution 
approach means that current period investment, savings, and consumption decisions are made on 
the basis of current period prices.  
Table 1.  EPPA Model Details. 
Country or Region†  Sectors Factors 
Developed Final Demand Sectors Capital  
   United States (USA) Agriculture  Labor  
   Canada (CAN) Services  Crude Oil Resources 
   Japan (JPN) Energy-Intensive Products  Natural Gas Resources 
   European Union+ (EUR) Other Industries Products  Coal Resources 
   Australia & New Zealand (ANZ) Transportation  Shale Oil Resources 
   Former Soviet Union (FSU) Household Transportation  Nuclear Resources 
   Eastern Europe (EET) Other Household Demand Hydro Resources 
Developing Energy Supply & Conversion Wind/Solar Resources 
   India (IND)  Electric Generation Land 
   China (CHN)     Conventional Fossil   
   Indonesia (IDZ)      Hydro   
   Higher Income East Asia (ASI)      Existing Nuclear   
   Mexico (MEX)      Wind, Solar   
   Central & South America (LAM)      Biomass   
   Middle East (MES)      Advanced Gas   
   Africa (AFR)      Advanced Gas with CCS   
   Rest of World (ROW)       Advanced Coal with CCS   
         Advanced Nuclear   
   Fuels  
      Coal  
       Crude Oil, Shale Oil, Refined Oil   
      Natural Gas, Gas from Coal  
      Liquids from Biomass  
       Synthetic Gas    
† Specific detail on regional groupings is provided in Paltsev et al. (2005). 
 
 Table 1 broadly identifies final demand sectors and energy supply and conversion sectors.  
Final demand sectors include five industrial sectors and two household demands, transportation 
and other household activities (space conditioning, lighting, etc.), as shown in the table. Energy 
supply and conversion sectors are modeled in enough detail to identify fuels and technologies 
with different CO2 emissions and to represent both fossil and non-fossil advanced technologies.  
The synthetic coal gas industry produces a perfect substitute for natural gas. The oil shale 
industry produces a perfect substitute for refined oil. All electricity generation technologies 
produce perfectly substitutable electricity except for Wind and Solar which is modeled as 
                                                 
2 The EPPA model can also be solved as a perfect foresight model.  See Gurgel et al. (2007) and Babiker et al. 
(2008).  
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producing an imperfect substitute, reflecting its diurnal and seasonal variability. Biomass use is 
included both in electric generation and in transport where a liquid fuel is produced that is 
assumed to be a perfect substitute for refined oil.  
 There are 16 geographical regions represented explicitly in the model including major 
countries (the U.S., Japan, Canada, China, India, and Indonesia) and 10 regions that are an 
aggregations of countries.  While the results in this paper focus on the U.S., economic and 
population growth and policies assumed to be in place abroad affect world markets, depletion of 
resources, and therefore the U.S. economy through international trade.  In this exercise we follow 
the Energy Modeling Forum protocol on policy in other regions (Clarke et al., 2009), with the 
developed countries reducing to 50% below 1990 levels by 2050; China, India, Russia, and 
Brazil starting in 2030 on a linear path to 50% below their 2030 emissions level by 2070; and the 
rest of the countries delaying action beyond the 2050 horizon of our study.  
 The model includes representation of abatement of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (CH4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) and the calculations consider both the emissions mitigation that 
occurs as a byproduct of actions directed at CO2 and reductions resulting from gas-specific 
control measures. Targeted control measures include reductions in the emissions of: CO2 from 
the combustion of fossil fuels; the industrial gases that replace CFCs controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol and produced at aluminum smelters; CH4 from fossil energy production and use, 
agriculture, and waste, and N2O from fossil fuel combustion, chemical production and improved 
fertilizer use. More detail on how abatement costs are represented for these substances is 
provided in Hyman et al. (2003).  
 When emissions constraints on certain countries, gases, or sectors are imposed in a CGE 
model such as EPPA, the model calculates a shadow value of the constraint which is 
interpretable as a price that would be obtained under an allowance market that developed under a 
cap and trade system.  The solution algorithm of the EPPA model finds least-cost reductions for 
each gas in each sector and if emissions trading is allowed it equilibrates the prices among 
sectors and gases (using GWP weights). This set of conditions, often referred to as “what” and 
“where” flexibility, will tend to lead to least-cost abatement.  Without these conditions 
abatement costs will vary among sources and that will affect the estimated welfare cost—
abatement will be least-cost within a sector or region or for a specific gas, but will not be 
equilibrated among them. 
 The mixed complementarity solution approach of the model means that least-cost is defined in 
terms of the tax inclusive prices (for fuels, electricity, capital, labor, and other goods) faced by 
producers and consumers given the technology set at any point in time.  It does not necessarily 
lead to a welfare optimum in the presence of distortions (e.g., energy taxes) or to the extent 
combined actions of individual agents have macroeconomic consequences such as affecting the 
terms of trade of a country/region (Babiker et al., 2004; Paltsev et al., 2007).  We simulate 
banking and borrowing, which implies foresight, by forcing the theoretical perfect foresight 
result that the CO2-e price path must rise at the discount rate, assumed to be 4%.  We do this by 
choosing an initial price so that the cumulative emissions are consistent with the policy target 
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over the horizon of the policy. Allowing banking and borrowing is sometimes referred to as 
“when” flexibility.  A price path rising at the discount rate means that the discounted price is 
equal in all time periods which is the temporal equivalent of equating the price across sectors or 
regions.  
 This approach to simulating banking approximates well the behavior of a perfect foresight 
model (Gurgel, et al., 2007) and generates a smooth price path.  Prices in real markets display 
volatility as observed in CO2 prices in the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) operating in 
Europe.  Of more relevance to the modeled price path is the observation that future prices and 
current prices differ by a risk free interest rate.  This result is observed in the ETS and reflects 
the possibility of arbitrage profits where, if this interest rate differential is not met, a combination 
of current purchase and forward sales, or vice versa would generate risk-free profits above that 
which could be obtained on low risk investments such as government bonds.  In a similar 
manner, the price simulated by the model is meant to represents the interest rate differential 
between current and future prices for allowances.  Under different assumptions about growth, 
technological options, and other inputs, different prices can be obtained that can vary quite a lot.  
The range one would get from such variation in assumptions is more comparable to the volatility 
of observed prices, where that volatility occurs as new information is revealed and changes 
expectations about the future. 
3. COMPARISON OF NEW RESULTS TO PREVIOUS RESULTS 
3.1 Modeling Assumptions 
 As noted above, one purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of recent changes in the 
economic and technology outlook.  Table 2 describes the key assumptions regarding technology 
costs and GDP growth in our previous study compared with the assumptions used here.  Average 
GDP growth for 2005 to 2050 is slower by 0.4% per year, in part, because we factor in the 
current recession.  Lower GDP growth compounded over 40 years results in emissions that are 
nearly 20% lower in 2050.  
 The cost mark-up defines the cost of the advanced electricity technologies relative to 
electricity prices in the 1997 base year of the model. In the previous work, we applied a mark-up 
of 2.26 to a technology sector meant to represent a combination of wind and solar.  In the revised 
model we have disaggregated this combined sector into two: wind and solar considered as 
separate sources.  Also, we apply lower mark-up costs (1.0 and 1.5 respectively), implying that 
wind is competitive and solar costs just 50% more than conventional electricity.  The biomass 
electricity markup is reduced from 2.1 to 1.1. 
Renewables enter the electricity sector in the EPPA model as imperfect substitutes for other 
electricity.3  That means that the mark-up costs are the cost of the first installations of these 
generation sources.  We assume these are located at sites with access to the best quality 
resources, at locations most easily integrated into the grid, and at levels where variable resources 
                                                 
3 For a description of this component of the EPPA model, see Paltsev et al. (2005). 
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can be accommodated without significant investment in storage or back-up.  The elasticity of 
substitution creates a gradually increasing cost of production as the share of renewables increases 
in the generation mix.  Thus, the mark-up cost strictly applies only to the first installations of 
these sources, and further expansion as a share of overall generation of electricity comes at 
greater cost.  Previously the elasticity was 1.0, which effectively limited renewables to a 
relatively small share of generation.  In these new simulations we increase it to 3.0, making it 
easier and less costly to expand the renewable share.    
The mark-ups on nuclear and coal with CCS, which are modeled as perfect substitutes for 
other conventional generation, were raised from 1.25 and 1.19 to 1.7 and 1.6 respectively. Some 
current estimates for coal with CCS suggest even higher mark-ups but here we assume this is for 
the nth plant after some experience is gained in the technology, and assuming that experience 
leads to lower costs. 
Table 2.  Key Economic and Technology Assumptions. 
  Report 146 Current study 
GDP growth, 2005-2050, rate/yr   2.9%   2.5% 
2050 baseline emissions 13.3 GtCO2e 10.8 GtCO2e 
Renewable electricity  
   Solar mark-up  2.26   1.5 
   Wind mark-up  2.26   1.0 
   Biomass mark-up  2.1   1.1 
   Substitution elasticity  1.0   3.0 
Advanced nuclear mark-up  1.25*   1.7 
CCS markup coal/gas  1.19/1.17   1.6/1.6 
Adv. Natural Gas Combined Cycle  0.95   1.2 
*Except for some sensitivity cases, advanced nuclear was assumed 
to be unavailable. 
 
There is much concern about the U.S. and world economy, with many indicators of economic 
performance suggesting a recession that could be quite severe by historic standards.  In terms of 
GDP growth, the annual data through 2008 still does not look that dire compared to history 
(Figure 1). 
In addition to historical data, the figure includes annual growth rates of GDP as forecasted by 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration in the central case of their early release 2009 energy 
outlook (EIA, 2008).  They assume negative growth in 2009, some rebound in 2010, and then a 
return to a basically stable long-term trend.  We use these same rates, averaging them over the 
five-year time step of the EPPA model. The five-year average rates are plotted as blue dots 
(historical data), red dots (EIA forecast period), pink dots (our extension of the EIA forecast 
which is only through 2030), and in brown are growth assumptions from our previous U.S. 
study.  As plotted in Figure 1 the difference between our previous growth rates and the new ones 
look insignificant except for the first period.  The appearance is driven by the scale of the graph 
needed to show historical rates. The actual difference is 0.5% per year or more through 2030, 
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and that big a difference persisting for many years has a fairly significant effect on the level of 
the economy and emissions. 
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Figure 1.  U.S. GDP Growth Rates, 1930 to 2008 and Projected Rates to 2050.
 We have also adjusted down growth in other developed countries, while our long-term 
forecast for China and India is higher than in Paltsev, et al. (2008).  The earlier estimates for 
India and China were below actual performance that was already observed since 2005.  The new 
growth rates are still below the very high rates seen before the recent economic crises.  These 
new growth rates include, as shown for the U.S., a near-term impact of the economic crisis but 
then a return to solid growth rates.  The longer term growth rates for the developed countries are 
slower than in our past work, reflecting not so much the lasting impact of the current economic 
crisis, but rather a re-evaluation of long-term growth prospects, where we still are quite 
optimistic.  Essentially we had extended through the next few decades the relatively robust 
growth of the late 1990’s through 2005.  If recovery from the current economic crisis is much 
slower, or signals a more fundamental change in growth prospects, then economic and emissions 
growth could be lower.  At this point, however, the current economic problems appear to stem 
from a housing bubble, loose lending, and the follow-on financial problems that once worked 
through, would not affect productivity improvements that underlie long term economic growth.  
3.2 Previous and New Results 
The resulting U.S. GDP and greenhouse gas emissions in a “No policy” (Reference) case are 
presented in Figure 2 and compared with similar results from our earlier work. Assumptions 
about slower economic growth lead to 15% lower GDP level (37.5 trillion instead of 44.2 trillion 
of 2005$) and 19% lower GHG emissions (10.7 Gt instead of 13.3 Gt CO2e) by 2050. 
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Figure 2. U.S. GDP and GHG in reference scenario. 
 
Figure 3 compares the CO2-e price and welfare results from Paltsev et al. (2008) (Figure 3a 
and b) with our new results based on the changes discussed above (Figure 3c and d). For the 287 
bmt case we see the strong effect of the lower economic growth assumption on the reference 
emissions.  This abatement level requires very little action with prices starting at $5/tCO2-e and 
only rising to $20 by 2050 in the new results compared with prices starting at $18 and rising to 
$70 in the old results.  The revised technology assumptions have little effect in this case because 
these prices are insufficient to bring many of these alternatives into the picture; the cap is met by 
other, less expensive means. 
In contrast, the CO2-e prices for the 203 and 167 bmt cases are roughly equal or slightly 
higher in the new results than in the old.  While advanced nuclear is available in these new 
scenarios (in Figure 3a and b simulations it was not allowed to grow), its cost is much higher 
than the CCS in the older results and the new CCS cost is also higher. The initial renewable 
installations are less expensive than in the old simulations, and also less than the old CCS cost, 
and these changes might be expected to lower the CO2-e price and make the nuclear and CCS 
costs irrelevant.  This does not happen because the increasing costs at higher levels of renewable 
penetration (as represented by the imperfect substitute assumption, even with the higher 
elasticity) does not allow them to completely substitute for nuclear and coal with CCS.  As a 
result, the price in the 167 bmt case starts at $58 in the new results compared with $53 in the old 
results and by 2050 rises to $230 instead of $210.  
The welfare results mirror the CO2-e price with the 2050 result in the 167 bmt case showing 
a 2.5% loss compared with about 1.75% loss in the old results.  The new results show a smoother 
increase in the welfare costs over time.  This change in pattern results because the old 
simulations had developing countries substantially increasing their reductions in 2035, and this 
resulted in a substantial improvement in the terms of trade for the U.S. in that period.  The new 
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simulations assume that policies abroad phase in more gradually. There still are terms of trade 
effects from actions abroad, but they are realized more gradually so there is not such a short-term 
impact as before.  The welfare costs in the 287 bmt case with the new growth assumptions are 
lower than under the previous growth assumptions.  
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Figure 3.  CO2-e Price and Welfare Results for Three Policy Scenarios: (a) Paltsev et al. 
(2008) CO2-e Price, (b) Paltsev et al. (2008) Welfare Change, (c) CO2-e Price with 
Revised Technological and Economic Outlook, (d) Welfare Change with Revised 
Technological and Economic Outlook. 
 
 Compared to the earlier analysis, we have made changes in technology outlook in the 
electricity sector, so we focus on the generation sources for the no-policy reference and the three 
policy cases, shown in Figure 4.  As previously, the no policy reference is strongly dominated 
by coal generation, with other sources basically maintaining their 2005 level.  The exceptions are 
solar and wind, which now expand from 0.5 EJ in 2010 to 1.1 EJ by 2050 rather than from 0.2 EJ 
to 0.6EJ as in the previous study.  However, even with that rapid expansion they remain a small 
share.  As discussed, the 287 bmt case is insufficient to get advanced nuclear or coal with CCS.  
The small reductions needed are met with natural gas, an expansion of renewables and some 
reduction in demand.  Since this is an economy-wide and all-GHG scenario some of the 
economy-wide reductions in all these cases are occurring in fuel use outside the electricity sector 
and from reductions of non-CO2 GHGs. 
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(e) Paltsev et al.  (2008) 203 bmt
0
5
10
15
20
25
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Year
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
 G
en
er
at
io
n,
 E
J 
   
 
(f) Paltsev et al.  (2008) 167 bmt
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Figure 4.  Electricity Generation by Sources in the Reference and Policy Cases: (a) 
Reference, (b) 287 bmt, (c) 203 bmt, (d) 167 bmt, (e) Paltsev et al. (2008) 203 bmt,  
(f) Paltsev et al. (2008) 167 bmt. 
 
The impacts of the new technology assumptions are more apparent in the 203 and 167 bmt 
cases.  Even though the nuclear mark-up is somewhat higher than the coal CCS mark-up we find 
that nuclear dominates in both cases.  CCS exists in the 203 bmt case but the level is so small 
that it does not show up well in the graph.  The reason for the success of nuclear over coal with 
CCS is that the assumption that coal CCS will capture only 90% of the CO2 emissions means 
that the extra cost associated with allowances needed to cover those emissions raise the CCS 
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cost, thereby favoring nuclear.  Also, renewables play a much larger role, increasing to on the 
order of 20% of generation whereas in the old analysis they were never more than a few percent. 
A not immediately intuitive result in the 167 bmt case is that, even though the constraint is 
tighter and CO2-e prices are higher than in the 203 bmt case, CCS applied to coal and gas plays a 
substantial role.  The reason is that, as formulated in the EPPA model, there are adjustment costs 
that increase for an advanced technology as the rate of expansion increases.  The representation 
of this phenomenon is based on expansion of nuclear power in the late 1960’s to the mid-1980’s, 
when nearly all new base load capacity was nuclear.  Thus what is happening in the 167 bmt case 
is that decarbonization of the electricity sector must proceed so rapidly to meet the economy-
wide target that adjustment costs in the favored technology (nuclear) are pushing up its cost and 
thereby allowing the CCS technologies to compete. Since fossil sources with CCS still emit 
some CO2, more reductions are needed elsewhere in the economy to make up for those 
emissions.  It also means that these extra adjustment costs run up the cost of the policy, and that 
ultimately the CCS technologies will go away as nuclear ultimately dominates.  CCS appears 
only because nuclear cannot expand fast enough, but once the capacity to expand nuclear catches 
up the CCS plants will depreciate away to be replaced by nuclear.  
4. DETAILS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND TECHNOLOGY ASSUMPTIONS 
4.1 System Coverage 
Generally, GHG reduction targets focus on total national emissions—all emissions affect 
global concentrations and thus international discussions tend to focus on the national aggregate. 
Nonetheless, considerations of policy implementation often lead to a focus on a subset of 
emissions sources.  Often this is because, it is argued at least, it is not worth the measurement 
and monitoring cost to include small and dispersed sources in a cap-and-trade system.  That may 
be true in some policy designs: for example, the number of small sources increases the farther 
downstream the system is imposed.  For energy-related CO2 emissions, of course, it is possible to 
move upstream, placing the point of control at the coal mine or electric generating station, 
refinery gate or natural gas distribution system. Any CO2 price is then passed through to final 
consumers as it would have been if they were directly required to surrender allowances.  Such an 
upstream system can reduce the number of control points and thereby make including these small 
end-use sources less onerous. But if the implementation is downstream, small sources are an 
issue. In addition, in an effort to limit costs imposed directly on consumers, some proposals 
would omit household use of natural gas and heating oil. 
For non-energy emissions of other greenhouse gases, and of CO2 from land use change, 
control must be imposed at the point of emissions because going upstream or downstream can 
lead to an inefficient result.  That is because incentives for available reduction options may not 
be provided by prices imposed upstream or downstream of that point.  For example, 
implementation of the cap-and-trade system could be upstream and apply allowances to fertilizer 
sales, thereby reducing N2O emissions from inorganic fertilizer use.  The allowances required 
could vary by the form of the fertilizer if there were evidence that emissions of N2O varied by 
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the type applied.  (Applied as anhydrous ammonia there are probably more N2O emissions than 
if applied in a solid form.)  Unfortunately, this approach would not provide incentives to apply 
the fertilizer at times of the year when less would be volatized as N2O. Methane emissions from 
livestock are even more difficult. Allowances could be required for each head of cattle sold, 
based on estimated methane emissions, but this would not provide incentives to reduce rates of 
methane emission per head but only the number of livestock. Or, if there were relatively easy 
ways to reduce methane emissions from manure handling, a policy that simply reduced the 
number of livestock would not efficiently get at that abatement option.  
Following the definitions appearing in some current policy discussions, we explore a policy 
design where agriculture, services, and the household sector (ex. personal transportation) are left 
uncapped.  This leaves out of the system many of the diffuse sources in the service sector and 
non-GHG emissions from agriculture and waste.  Transportation, including the private 
automobile, is included through an upstream cap. This design is similar to that in the Warner-
Lieberman Bill submitted to the previous session of Congress and analyzed by Paltsev et al. 
(2008).  Interpretations of that bill were that the percentage reductions would apply only to the 
included sectors, and thus national emissions would not fall by that percentage as the uncapped 
sectors might grow—or at least would not fall.  Here we consider the case where additional 
reductions are imposed on the capped sectors so that the overall percentage reduction targets are 
met for the economy.    
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Figure 5.  Effects of Meeting a National Target with Agriculture, Services and Household 
Sectors Excluded from Cap: (a) CO2-e Price, (b) Welfare Change. 
 
Our main interest is how much this approach increases the cost of meeting an emissions 
target, and Figure 5 shows the effect on CO2-e prices and the welfare cost for the 167 bmt case 
with excluded sectors (167_sector) compared with the case where we achieve the nation-wide 
target by including all sources. The omitted sectors emissions are about 17% of base-year 
emissions; in the no-policy reference they are growing more slowly than other emissions and so 
they fall to about 13% of economy-wide GHG emissions by 2050.  Excluding these emissions 
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from the cap, and forcing more reductions in the capped sectors, has a more than proportional 
impact on costs.  The CO2-e price goes up by about 30% and the welfare cost is increased by 
different amounts in different years but by as much as 30 to 50% in many years.  This more-
than-proportional response should not be surprising as (1) we are not taking advantage of low-
cost reductions in the excluded sectors, and (2) we are forcing more high-cost reductions in the 
capped sectors.   
4.2 Target Credibility and Banking Behavior 
The next simulation considers truncation of the banking horizon to 2030.  The resulting 
welfare and CO2-e prices are shown in Table 3. GHG prices are reduced by more than one-half 
and the welfare effects are reduced to less than one-third of the loss compared to the case with 
the 2050 banking horizon.  Thus, the near-term targets are relatively modest, and with banking 
over the full horizon it is the post-2030 reductions that are driving near term prices to higher 
levels. If the long term targets are ignored then much less needs to be done in the near term, and 
the costs are lower.  With forward looking behavior, future reductions will affect near term 
prices but the effect will depend on how strong a reduction is required in the longer term and the 
representation of technological options.  As noted earlier, if market participants view the long 
term targets as not credible then they may not bank for the future, expecting looser targets and 
lower prices.  Or, if our representation of technology in the long term is much more pessimistic 
than that held by market participants then current prices would not be driven up as much as we 
have simulated in the 2050 banking case.  
Table 3. Effects of a Shorter Banking Horizon. 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Welfare cost 
   167 bmt -0.22 -0.63 -1.05   -1.52 
   167_2030 -0.03 -0.18 -0.30   -0.41 
CO2-e price 
   167 bmt 58 71 86 105 
   167_2030 25 31 37   45 
 
The results with the shorter banking horizon give an idea of the importance of these effects 
on current prices.  Obviously, long term targets could be changed in either direction, leading to 
higher or lower prices than those obtained assuming the long term target is met exactly.  
Similarly, market participants could be more pessimistic about technology in the long term than 
we have represented.  If so, near term costs would be higher than we have estimated in the 2050 
banking case, not lower.  Also, the 2030 banking case is on the low end of what costs could be in 
these cases, assuming our representation of pre-2030 technology options is accurate.  To get 
lower pre-2030 prices based on optimism about technology or skepticism about the policy in the 
post-2030 period it would have to be possible to borrow from the future, and most legislation 
limits such borrowing.  We should also note that the 2050 horizon also truncates the banking 
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horizon.  Banked allowances are being used in 2050, so that actual emissions are above the 
allocated allowances in that year.  Thus, even if annual allowance allocations remained at the 
2050 level in the post-2050 period further sharp cuts from the simulated 2050 emissions level 
would be needed.  Hence, if we simulated over a longer horizon we would likely see further 
banking and even higher prices in the near term. 
Figure 6 shows what the shorter banking horizon does to the generation choices. The effects 
are dramatic. In the standard 167 bmt case coal is largely phased out even by 2030 and 
renewables have expanded substantially.  Advanced CCS and nuclear are small but beginning to 
be developed in this case.  With the 2030 horizon, very little of that change takes place.  Coal use 
stays high and there is no CCS or nuclear expansion.  These results illustrate the role of long 
term targets. With them, important preparations for deeper cuts after 2030 are put in place by 
2030 but if they are ignored as not credible then it will be that much more difficult to achieve the 
deeper cuts.  With the lower prices, taking seriously only the targets through 2030, the needed 
transformation of the electricity sector to non-fossil alternatives is barely started.  Also, if the 
future targets are ignored then there is little incentive to do the demonstration and research that 
might bring about cheaper technology.  These results reveal an important aspect of the policy 
challenge of providing credible long term targets while trying to keep near term economic costs 
manageable.  
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Figure 6.  Electricity Generation Choices with a Shorter Banking Horizon: (a) 167 bmt, (b) 
167_2030. 
  
 Another argument sometimes put forward for ignoring the long term targets in simulation 
exercises of this type is that planning horizons of firms only extend 20 years or so into the future.  
However, the short planning horizon argument appears fallacious to us.  A source of confusion 
on this issue is that observers fail to take account of the fact that we will gradually approach 
these longer term goals, and as we approach them they will become more relevant to decisions at 
that point in time.  Thus, the effect of the post-2030 reductions on 2015 emissions, seen by 
comparing Figure 6a with Figure 6b, is noticeable but not that extreme.  Coal use drops a little 
faster and renewables penetrate a bit more when the horizon is 2050.  The bigger differences 
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begin occurring in 2020, but by that time 2030 is only 10 years away. Assuming those making 
decisions about generation investments are still looking ahead 20 years, their planning period 
will include 10 years beyond 2030, and by that time the technology and policy environment after 
2030 will be much clearer.   
Of course, it may be that the clearing picture will include either a less ambitious target or 
market expectations of advances in technology beyond what we have represented in our 
modeling effort.  However, progress on these technologies would have to come quickly.  Many 
of the advanced technologies we represent have been in development for many years already.  A 
radically new technology will require testing and demonstration and then will only gradually 
penetrate the market, especially in the electric sector where investments are long-lived.  The 
other factor to consider is that the planning horizon of individual firms that must abate is not 
necessarily relevant to whether long term expectations will affect near term prices.  Unless 
allowances ownership is restricted, anyone can acquire allowances and hold them on the 
expectation that the asset will appreciate.  Investors of all types, with a variety of expectations, 
will determine how future targets affect current prices.  
4.3 Other Policy Implementation Issues 
There are other policy implementation issues that could have strong effects on costs.  One 
feature in most proposed cap and trade systems are credits from reductions outside the system 
either from trading with a foreign region that is capped (e.g., the ETS) or from projects in 
uncapped domestic sectors (e.g., land use emissions) or in countries without caps (e.g., Clean 
Development Mechanism credits).  These are often seen as measures that would significantly 
reduce costs.  The effects of such credits on domestic costs are very difficult to assess and it is 
easy to overestimate their contribution to lower costs for several reasons: (1) The value of 
trading with other regions depends on the autarkic price in those regions.  If other regions are 
taking similar cuts then the autarkic price may be similar to domestic autarkic prices and trading 
will provide very little advantage. (2) The amount of project credits from uncapped sectors and 
regions are easy to overestimate because the project assessment and baseline establishment tends 
to be onerous and as a result these credit systems appear to generate only a small fraction of the 
credits one might expect from these sectors if they were capped. (3) For CDM-type credits the 
goal is to have these regions eventually take on real caps, and as they do the pool of potential 
credits is lowered. (4) There will be international competition for credits and for foreign 
allowances that will bid up the prices for them. Often in analysis of domestic policies 
competition for foreign credits is not considered, and it is assumed that these foreign credits will 
come in at prices substantially below the autarkic domestic price, with the difference maintained 
by limits on the use of credits.  In Paltsev et al. (2008) we considered some of these issues with 
credits and international emissions trading. 
Another feature of many proposals are a host of complementary policies such as renewable 
portfolio standards, fuel standards, public infrastructure investments such as in alternative transit 
systems, building codes, and efficiency regulations among other things.  These are difficult to 
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assess because the number of things considered can be nearly endless.  One might consider these 
measures in three categories:  (1) Redundant measures focused narrowly on advancing particular 
technologies, (2) Policies designed to address market failures, and (3) Investment in public 
infrastructure that under higher energy prices brought about by GHG mitigation policy might be 
justified. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and Renewable Fuels Standards (RFS) or Low Carbon 
Fuel Standards (LCFS) are examples of measure that are at best redundant—the GHG cap-and-
trade would get to the RPS or RFS goal without the standards—or they add to the economy-wide 
cost of the policy by shifting investment away from the least-cost options and toward meeting 
these specific standards.  In this case they can reduce the CO2 price while raising the welfare cost 
of the policy.  
Building codes, appliance standards, and similar measures may fall into category 2 because it 
is not implausible that the average household may not fully understand the source of energy costs 
in the household and how to control them.  Such standards and codes already exist. Anticipating 
that energy prices will rise with implementation of a cap-and-trade system means that current 
codes should be revised if such measures were justified in the first place.  We are skeptical that 
there are massive no cost options here. For one thing, code development, appliance labeling, and 
standards development in response to changing prices is reflected in estimates of price 
elasticities from periods that included these measures as a response to earlier periods of higher 
prices.  To the extent elasticity estimates we use in the model already include such responses, if 
there are not similar complementary policies of this type costs may be higher than we estimate.  
Finally, the transportation system and development patterns are strongly affected by public 
investment.  To the extent those public investments respond to demands of citizens, which are 
likely to change with higher energy prices, one might expect that the nature of public investment 
and zoning and planning that shape development of urban areas should change. More public 
transportation, support for pedestrian or bicycle traffic, or zoning changes that allow for denser 
development are public decisions that may respond to changed demands of a citizenry facing 
higher energy prices brought on by a GHG cap-and-trade system.  Thus, in principle such 
investments can be complementary to the GHG policy, providing cost-effective options to more 
energy intensive life styles. 
The caricatures of each of the measures above do not do justice to these complex issues.  If 
there is hope that an RPS can overcome initial development costs and lead eventually to 
technologies that compete on their own there may be some justification for them. In the codes 
and standards or public investment areas it is not hard to go too far and legislate standards that 
are not in the interest of fully informed consumers or to invest in infrastructure that is 
underutilized or for which the marginal value is below the marginal cost.  To fully investigate the 
role of these complementary measures requires a much more careful assessment than is possible 
here.  
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4.4 Technology Costs 
We next consider the effect of different cost assumptions about nuclear, CCS, and 
renewables. In a nuclear case (167_nuclear) we give the cost advantage to nuclear, assuming its 
mark-up is 1.5, somewhat lower than CCS at 1.6. In a case favoring CCS (167_ccs) we increase 
the nuclear mark-up to 2.0.  In a third case (167_wind_gas) we assume that neither nuclear or 
CCS will be available at all.  This last case is motivated by the possible difficulties in siting 
nuclear plants or potential regulatory hurdles for the development of storage for captured CO2. In 
a fourth case (167_wind_slow) we go back to our original elasticity of 1.0 for renewable sources 
which slows renewable penetration on the basis that expansion requires a significant additional 
cost for storage and back-up generation. The price and welfare effects are shown in Table 4 and 
compared with the basic 167 bmt case. 
Table 4.  Effects of Alternative Technology Assumptions. 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Welfare Change        
   167 bmt -0.22 -0.63 -1.05 -1.52 -2.03 -2.32 -2.38 -2.52 
   167_nuclear -0.15 -0.68 -1.27 -1.65 -1.91 -1.99 -2.01 -1.96 
   167_ccs -0.23 -0.65 -1.08 -1.56 -1.98 -2.29 -2.38 -2.54 
   167_wind_gas -0.28 -0.73 -1.17 -1.63 -1.97 -2.16 -2.63 -2.99 
   167_wind_slow -0.17 -0.54 -1.05 -1.60 -2.04 -2.32 -2.38 -2.60 
CO2-e Price        
   167 bmt 58 71   86 105 127 155 188 229 
   167_nuclear 48 59   71   87 106 129 157 190 
   167_ccs 59 72   88 107 130 159 193 235 
   167_wind_gas 67 82 100 121 148 180 218 266 
   167_wind_slow 60 73   88 108 131 159 194 236 
 
The direction of price and welfare with these changes, compared to earlier assumptions, is as 
expected though care is needed in interpretation of the results.  The nuclear case has a lower 
welfare cost because we assumed nuclear was less expensive, and the CCS case is more 
expensive because CCS comes in by virtue of the fact that we raised the nuclear cost.  If instead 
we had dropped the CCS cost to something more substantially below nuclear, then the welfare 
costs in that case would have fallen.   
Perhaps more interesting is the 167_wind_gas case. The exclusion of CCS and nuclear rule 
out two big low-carbon options, which should make the task of achieving these goals much 
harder.  While excluding these options raises the cost substantially the simulation results 
suggests it does not make the target unachievable—by 2050 the welfare loss is higher, compared 
to the 167 bmt case by about 0.5 percent and the 2015 CO2-e price is about $10 per ton higher.  
Similarly, the 167_wind_slow case increases the cost, but relatively modestly.  Since raising the 
price of one option, or even making some options unavailable, just leads to use of other options, 
the cost impact is moderated.  Assuming that any one option becomes very inexpensive would 
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have a big impact on costs, or assuming that none of the options are available or were very costly 
would increase the costs much more.  The ranges we explore here appear to capture ranges one 
might reasonably expect. 
We turn next to the generation choices in these scenarios to see better how these targets are 
achieved under different cost assumptions (Figure 7).  In the 167_nuclear case the relatively 
small cost advantage for nuclear allows it to dominate and at the 1.5 markup it also substantially 
limits renewable expansion.  Even gas is driven out. This result may be unrealistic as it is not 
clear where peak and shoulder generation would come from in this case since nuclear cannot be 
flexibly dispatched.  In the 167_ccs case, both coal and gas CCS play a role and natural gas use 
expands.  With only a 90% capture rate on the CCS technologies, more gas, and a slightly slower 
phase out of conventional coal, it is clear that in this case emissions from the electricity sector 
are higher than under the 167_nuclear assumptions.   
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Figure 7. Alternative Technology Assumptions and Generation Choices: (a) 167_nuclear, 
(b) 167_ccs, (c) 167_wind_gas, (d) 167_wind_slow. 
 
Since we are focusing here only on the electricity sector, it is important to keep in mind that 
this is an economy-wide policy.  Thus, when there are cheaper options in the electricity sector as 
in the 167_nuclear case the electricity sector does more of the abatement and takes pressure off 
emissions elsewhere in the economy. In the 167_ccs case the electricity options are more 
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expensive and the CCS technologies are not completely carbon free.  As a result more of the 
reduction is pushed into the rest of the economy.  If neither advanced nuclear nor the CCS 
technologies are available then, as shown in the 167_wind_gas case, renewables and gas provide 
about two-thirds of the generation and existing nuclear and hydro power fill in the rest. As we 
noted above, meeting the 167 bmt target through the 2050 horizon without new nuclear or CCS 
is possible without increasing the costs dramatically.  
It should be noted that the viability of the 167_wind_gas case is questionable if the analysis 
is extended beyond 2050 in scenarios that require stabilization of GHG concentrations. This level 
of gas use in this case would eventually become problematic as very low levels of CO2 emissions 
are allowable.  In addition, another way the target is accomplished is by raising the near term 
prices and abating more immediately thus making room for emissions from natural gas 
generation in the 2040-2050 period.  If the horizon is shifted further, and the 80 percent 
reduction goal is maintained or increased, more and more of the reduction would need to be 
shifted forward, and there is an obvious limit to how much shifting can occur.  Thus, in the 
longer term the reliance on gas is probably not tenable. 
The broader lesson from these alternative technology cases is that fairly small changes in the 
relative costs of different technology options can lead to a very different set of generation 
choices.  The effect on the economy-wide cost is moderated if one or another option ends up 
more expensive or unavailable because there are other choices.  The value of broad economic 
incentive-based policy, as opposed to policies that focus on a particular technology, is that we do 
not need to guess which technology is going to succeed.   
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we updated an earlier analysis of the cost of GHG mitigation policy in the U.S.  
We focused on three policy scenarios described by the allowable emissions through 2050: 287, 
203, and 167 billion metric tons (bmts).  Since the time of the earlier analysis, a variety of 
conditions have changed that are likely to affect the cost of mitigation policy in the U.S.  The 
economic recession has dimmed the outlook for economic growth, likely leading to lower 
reference emissions which would tend to reduce the costs of meeting the policy.  At the same 
time, however, the costs and prospects for key low carbon technologies have changed.  Nuclear 
and CCS costs are now seen to be considerably higher than we estimated just a few years ago.  
On the positive side, however, some utilities are moving ahead with plans to build new nuclear 
power plants.  Thus, we have allowed an advanced generation of nuclear power plants to take 
market share if they can compete at the relatively higher costs.  Also, renewables are expanding 
rapidly and some progress has been made on the technologies.  It is unclear what the current 
rapid expansion of renewables means for the longer term because it is spurred by direct subsidies 
and favorable tax treatment.  Also, the domestic policy discussion has focused on the deeper 
emissions cuts and so the 287 bmt case is not that relevant to current legislative proposals.   
Combining all of these factors causes our estimates of the difficulty of meeting the 203 and 
167 bmt cases to rise somewhat. In the 167 bmt case the CO2-e price starts at $58/tCO2-e 
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compared with $53 in the old results and by 2050 rises to $230 instead of $210. The welfare 
results mirror the CO2-e price with the 2050 result in the 167 bmt case showing a 2.5% loss 
compared with about 1.75% loss in the old results.  The increase is similar in the 203 bmt case. 
The new results for the 287 bmt case actually have lower costs because the lower reference 
emissions resulting from slower economic growth dominate the changes in the technology cost 
assumptions. 
A number of questions have also arisen as to how the policy might be implemented.  For a 
variety of reasons, many proposed measures only directly control emissions on a subset of 
activities while international negotiations on emissions reductions tally up emissions from all 
sources.  Thus, to meet an agreed national target with a less than comprehensive cap-and-trade 
system would require tightening the cap to make up for the omitted sectors.  Most of the current 
proposals allow for credits from uncapped sectors to be brought into the cap-and-trade system.  If 
these offsets created incentives to reduce in the non-capped sectors as effectively as actually 
including those sectors under the cap, then further tightening of the cap on the controlled sectors 
and allowing these offsets to flow in would be equivalent to having a comprehensive national 
cap.  However, credit systems can be very ineffective, failing to create effective incentives for 
control with reductions in some projects offset by increased “leakage” emissions from other part 
of the sector.  We construct a case where the capped sectors must make up entirely for the failure 
to cap some sectors. We leave out agriculture, households, and the service sector that together 
account for about 17% of emissions, falling in our no policy case to 13% by 2050.  We find the 
cost impact to be more than proportional.  CO2-e prices increase by about 30%, and welfare costs 
increase as much as 30% to 50%, varying over the time horizon. Omissions are costly because 
we fail to take advantage of low cost reductions in these sectors, and we force more high cost 
reductions in the capped sectors. 
There are also skeptics of banking over long periods. Are these very long targets credible? 
Might we be too pessimistic in our representation of long term technology options? Do firms 
even look that far into future when making near term plans?  To consider these questions, we 
solved the model with banking only through 2030 implying that the targets and potential cost of 
meeting them after 2030 were ignored.  One assumption that would justify this under-banking 
behavior would be if the expectation was that abatement would be such after 2030 that the CO2-e 
price would continue to rise smoothly at the discount rate from the price solved in 2030 with the 
truncated horizon.  The truncated banking case cut near term welfare costs by two-thirds and the 
CO2-e price by more than one-half.  Thus, at least as we represent the economy and the 
technology choices available to it over this period, the post-2030 targets are a large driver of the 
near term costs of the policy.  If the policy is enacted, the market may have different 
expectations for technology options or be skeptical that these targets will be maintained, and so 
of course actual market results may differ from our representation.  In looking at the electricity 
sector, if investors simply ignore the distant targets and proceed as if all that mattered were 
targets through 2030, then they would not begin the transformation that was actually needed to 
meet the long term targets.   
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We then consider several alternative assumptions about the cost and availability of nuclear, 
CCS, and renewables.  We find that varying the relative costs of these over what we think are 
sensible ranges does not have a large effect on the overall cost to the economy.  If one or another 
of these generation sources is assumed to be costly or unavailable, other options are available for 
greater expansion and some of the reduction task can be shifted to other parts of the economy.  
Obviously, assuming nothing would work or that a miracle happens and a costless way to 
produce energy without carbon comes along would give a very costly or a very cheap solution, 
but there is not much sense in simulating such fantasy scenarios.  The important lesson is that a 
broad cap-and-trade system will let the market choose the set of options that is least costly, and 
so if any one or two are available the costs will remain under control. Policies that instead 
attempt to pick particular technologies run the risk of picking ones that may not pan out and 
those approaches to mitigation would then be more costly. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED RESULTS 
* Only a sample page is attached here. The full version of the Appendix in Excel format is 
available at: http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt173_AppendixA.xls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference 
  2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
ECONOMY WIDE INDICATORS             
Population (billion) 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.44 
GDP (trillion 2005$) 11.09 13.25 17.48 22.57 29.25 37.53 
% Change GDP from Reference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Market Consumption (trillion 2005$) 7.77 9.03 11.83 15.16 19.59 25.09 
% Change Consumption from Reference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Welfare (trillion 2005$) 9.12 10.62 14.30 18.67 24.23 31.12 
% Change Welfare from Reference (EV) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CO2-E Price (2005$/tCO2-e) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRICES             
Oil (2005$/barrel) 32.00 65.09 88.20 120.47 142.83 159.32 
Natural Gas (2005$/GJ) 4.40 6.75 8.08 10.21 13.66 18.35 
Coal (2005$/GJ) 1.50 1.46 1.55 1.62 1.71 1.80 
Electricity (2005$/kWh) 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 
GHG EMISSIONS (GT CO2-e)             
GHG Emissions 6.96 6.96 7.59 8.17 9.22 10.74 
CO2 Emissions 5.85 5.90 6.50 7.02 8.03 9.45 
CH4 Emissions 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 
N2O Emissions  0.42 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.29 
Fluorinated Gases Emissions 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.39 0.48 0.59 
     HFCs 0.10 0.16 0.25 0.37 0.46 0.57 
     PFCs 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     SF6 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
PRIMARY ENERGY USE (EJ)             
Oil 40.2 41.4 45.8 48.7 54.9 62.5 
Gas w/o CCS 21.8 22.3 24.3 25.1 24.8 23.7 
Gas w/ CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coal w/o CCS 22.7 22.2 24.4 27.5 33.3 39.7 
Coal w/ CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Biomass Liquids (primary energy eq) 1.0 2.1 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.1 
Nuclear (primary energy eq) 8.3 8.9 8.5 8.2 8.1 8.0 
Total Non-Biomass Renewables (prim en eq) 3.0 4.3 5.2 5.9 5.7 5.8 
     Wind (primary energy eq) 0.0 1.2 2.1 2.8 2.6 2.5 
     Solar (primary energy eq) 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
     Hydro (primary energy eq) 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 
Total Primary Energy Use 97.0 101.1 109.9 117.5 129.3 142.8 
Reduced Use from Reference 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION (EJ) 
Oil 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Gas w/o CCS 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 
Gas w/ CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coal w/o CCS 6.7 7.0 8.1 9.3 11.5 14.0 
Coal w/ CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Biomass 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Total Non-Biomass Renewables 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 
     Wind 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 
     Solar 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
     Hydro 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 
Total Electricity Production 13.0 13.8 15.3 17.0 19.2 21.8 
Carbon Storage (GT CO2-e) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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APPENDIX B: MEASURING THE COST OF CLIMATE POLICY 
 
This note provides an overview of different measures of costs of climate policy. While in our 
studies we stress emissions prices and welfare changes, here we illustrate the measures in most 
common use, showing results for the 167 bmt scenario from Paltsev et al (2009). Similar results 
for the other scenarios can be derived from Appendix A to that report. These are studies of 
mitigation costs only and do not consider climate benefits and potential ancillary non-climate 
benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation, e.g., through reduced urban air pollution. 
1. Emissions Price 
A price on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is usually stated per metric ton of CO2, or in the 
case of multiple gases, per metric ton of CO2-equivalent, or CO2-e. Such a price may be 
established through a market that develops for emissions allowances issued under a cap-and-
trade system (the allowance price) or through an emissions tax set directly by a regulating 
agency. Because CO2 is the largest contributor among the long-lived greenhouse gases, the CO2-
e concept has come to be widely used. CO2-e prices use Global Warming Potential (GWP) 
indices that take account of the different lifetimes and direct climate effects to calculate the 
amount of CO2 that would have the same effect as, for example, a ton of methane or nitrous 
oxide.4 Since the GWP index uses CO2 as the numeraire (i.e., its index value is 1.0), there is no 
difference in CO2 or CO2-e prices for CO2. The value of the CO2-e measure is that it makes 
prices for other GHGs comparable, in terms of the warming avoided per ton, to that of CO2. An 
example of CO2-e prices for the 167 bmt scenario is provided in Table A1. 
Table A1. CO2-e Price 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
CO2-E Price 
(2005$/tCO2-e) 70.68 104.62 154.86 229.23 
Emissions prices measure marginal cost, that is, the cost of an additional unit of emissions 
reduction. Emissions prices are an indicator of the relative scarcity of the allowances compared 
with the demand for them, but they are not a measure of “total cost” to the economy. Just as, for 
example, the price of a gallon of milk does not provide an indication of the total cost of all the 
milk produced in the country. That is, prices convey no information about the physical volumes 
to which they apply or the magnitude of the cost compared to the level of activity (e.g., size of 
                                                 
4 The convention in recent years has been to report prices per ton of CO2. An earlier convention was to report prices 
in tons of C—counting only the carbon weight in the CO2 molecule. A residual effect of this earlier convention 
is to sometimes see a reference to the “carbon price” applied even in the case where the price is stated per ton of 
CO2 rather than per ton C. To convert from a per ton C price to a per ton CO2 price multiply by the molecular 
weight of the CO2 molecule (44) divided by the molecular weight of the carbon atom (12), or 3.667. A price of 
$27.27/ton CO2 is thus the same as $100/ton C.  
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the firm or of the total economy). Just as the total cost of milk production depends on how much 
milk was produced, the total cost to the economy of greenhouse gas emissions reduction policy 
depends on how much reduction occurred. Note that what is being “produced” with a cap-and-
trade system is abatement of emissions, i.e., emissions reduction. Determining the emissions 
reduction requires an assessment of what emissions would have been without the policy where 
with milk production we can simple measure how much milk was produced.5 Prices can also be 
a misleading indicator of the cost when they interact with other policies and measures — either
those directed at greenhouse gas reduction (for example, renewable portfolio standards or 
subsidies to carbon-free technologies) or simply other policy instruments such as other taxes on 
energy, labor, or capital. This is no different than for other prices in the economy — our price of 
milk, for example. If there are no other policy measures the price of milk will fully reflect the 
marginal cost, but if there are farm subsidies or price supports, the milk price will be a poor 
indicator of the marginal cost. 
 
2. Welfare Change 
For many economists the preferred measure of total economic cost of greenhouse gas 
abatement or of other policy measures is the change in consumer welfare, measured in terms of 
“equivalent variation”, as this measure considers the GHG price and the amount of abatement 
and can include the effect of interactions with other policy measures to the extent these other 
policy measures are modeled. And, whereas the CO2 price measures the marginal cost, a welfare 
measure takes into account the fact that many of the reductions likely cost less than the last ton 
abated. Welfare is also generally a measure that is broader than just market activity and as such 
the change in welfare includes changes in both labor and leisure time. Leisure is considered a 
good and in models like EPPA it is represented by the monetary value of the non-working time. 
In coming up with a measure of change in welfare any reductions (increases) in the amount of 
work time are offset by increases (decreases) in the amount of leisure time. The welfare change 
in the 167 bmt scenario is provided in Table A2. 
Table A2. Welfare Change 
  2020 2030 2040 2050
% Change Welfare from 
Reference (EV) -0.63 -1.52 -2.32 -2.52 
Many features of the EPPA model (level of aggregation, nesting structure, elasticities, etc.) 
affect this result, but a couple of features are worth special mention. One is the influence of the 
tax interaction effect.6 A price on greenhouse gases will increase producers’ costs, effectively 
reducing the real returns to the factors of production, such as capital, labor, and energy. If, as is 
                                                 
5 The caution here is to avoid the temptation to estimate the cost to the economy on the basis of how many 
allowances were issued which is directly observable.  
6 For a summary of issues that arise in assessment of the cost of environmental policies see Goulder (2000). 
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common, there are pre-existing taxes on these factors, the GHG price has the effect of an 
increase in factor taxes, compounding the distortion caused by the prior tax system. This tax 
interaction effect will influence both the net government revenue from an allowance auction or 
emissions tax and the welfare effect of the policy. This is an effect missed by single-sector 
analyses of environmental policy. It is, however, captured by the EPPA model (subject to 
possible limitations imposed by its level of sectoral aggregation) because of its multi-sector 
general equilibrium structure and the fact that pre-existing taxes are included in the underlying 
data base.7 
A second feature concerns the effect of assumptions about the distribution of auction 
proceeds from a cap-and-trade system or the revenue from an emissions tax. In the EPPA model, 
a single agent represents the demands and behavior of the consumer side of the economy, and the 
value of emissions allowances (or tax revenue) is assumed to be returned to this representative 
consumer in a lump-sum transfer, equivalent to giving the allowances away for free in a lump 
sum manner. With lump-sum distribution the auction or tax revenues do not, by themselves, 
change the amount of total tax revenue or the size of the government. However, because overall 
economic activity (which is the tax base for all other taxes) is generally lower under a policy, the 
amount of total tax revenue and the size of a government will be lower unless tax rates are raised 
to compensate for the drop in the tax base. In analyses conducted here, we hold tax rates constant 
and allow the size of government revenue and expenditures to vary. 
Many other assumptions about auction and tax revenue are possible and would lead to 
different estimates of welfare change. For example, if rather than lump-sum redistribution the 
revenue is used to reduce other taxes, the effect will be to lower the welfare cost because it 
reduces the distortionary effect of these taxes.8 Free distribution of allowances raises the 
possibility that one may need to raise other tax rates to keep the total tax revenue constant so that 
the existing level of government can be maintained, and the higher taxes will increase the 
welfare cost by increasing the distortionary effect of these taxes. If, on the other hand, revenue is 
used for other purposes—e.g., supporting research and development (R&D), subsidizing low-
emitting technologies, compensating low income consumers or affected industries, or funding 
unrelated government programs—then the welfare cost will depend on how effectively the funds 
are spent. If revenue is used for R&D, which is effectively directed to projects with high returns, 
welfare effects can be positive. But if allowance or tax revenue is spent on poorly managed 
programs of the little value, then the funds will be mostly wasted, raising the welfare cost. The 
value of government expenditure are difficult to measure and so there are widely differing views 
on whether and under what circumstances additional revenue can be used effectively. The debate 
on use of GHG auction or tax revenue taps into the conventional debate about the appropriate 
size and role of the government. Other cost measures, described below, are similarly influenced 
by the tax interaction effect and assumptions about revenue and/or permit distribution. 
                                                 
7 For an example of this effect, when a carbon charge is imposed on top of high fuel taxes, see Paltsev et al. (2004). 
8 A perfect foresight version of the EPPA model has been applied to exploration of the use of such revenue to the 
reduction of labor and/or capital taxes, see Gurgel et al. (2007) and Babiker et al. (2008). 
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3. Consumption Change 
Changes in macroeconomic consumption as a measure of cost is closely related to welfare 
changes described above. The only difference is that consumption change considers only the 
market impacts and so excludes changes in leisure time (i.e., the monetary value of the change in 
non-working time) that occur in response to the policy. The consumption change is usually larger 
than the welfare change because an increase in the price of consumption (due to an increase in 
energy prices) leads to a reallocation of time to non-market activities. The magnitude of the shift 
depends on the labor supply elasticity. Also, consumption change in percentage terms is higher 
than the welfare measure in percentage terms because the base (total consumption) excludes a 
value of leisure time and so the base against which the percentage is calculated is lower. The 
consumption change in the 167 bmt scenario is provided in Table A3. 
Table A3. Consumption change 
  2020 2030 2040 2050
% Change Consumption 
from Reference 
-1.13 -2.24 -3.25 -3.49 
4. GDP Change 
The change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a measure of cost often used by non-
economists because GDP is the measure of economic activity that is most familiar to a general 
audience. It is a less satisfactory indicator of cost than welfare loss or consumption change for 
several reasons. It is useful to recognize that GDP is defined as Consumption (as in Section 3 
above) + Investment + Government + (Exports-Imports). The welfare and consumption measures 
preferred by economists because they measure the amount of goods people consume. GDP is a 
measure of output, which is not necessarily consumption. Investment goods produced in a given 
year add to the availability of consumptions goods over many years and hence changes in 
investment are not directly comparable to a loss of consumption in a year. Government is not a 
final consumer but through transfer programs (e.g., Social Security) or provision of public 
services (education, police) provides money or goods and services to final consumers. As for 
international trade, how many foreign goods can be bought for a given amount of domestic 
money is more relevant to consumption than the net of exports over imports. The amount of 
foreign goods depends on how the terms-of-trade (i.e., the price of domestic to foreign goods) 
changes. Higher terms-of-trade means we can purchase more foreign goods for every dollar, 
whereas deteriorating terms-of-trade means we can purchase less. As climate policy affects 
energy prices, for large energy exporters or importers, these trade effects may be substantial but 
are not captured by the GDP measure as normally computed. Moreover, what is relevant for 
welfare is the consumption of the imports and how income from exports is used for consumption 
today or for investment and future consumption. Direct consumption of imports by households 
(and indirect use of imports through their use as intermediate inputs to domestic goods) is 
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included in the measure of consumption described in Section 3. Any net export income that is 
saved and invested contributes to future consumption. While many of these changes net out, 
GDP changes can lead to double counting of the cost of a policy, particularly if GDP impacts 
over time are considered. Then the change in investment is counted in the year when investment 
is affected (i.e., reduced) because it is part of GDP and that effect is counted again in future years 
as reduced consumption because of the lower capital stock due to less investment in earlier years. 
The GDP changes in the 167 bmt scenario are provided in Table A4. 
Table A4. GDP change 
  2020 2030 2040 2050
% Change GDP from 
Reference -1.45 -2.45 -3.34 -3.70 
5. Per Capita and Per Family Costs 
Whereas we reported the above changes in welfare, consumption and GDP as percentage 
changes, these can also be converted into absolute dollar levels and then divided by population or 
the number of households to arrive at a per capita or per household cost. This measure can then 
be compared with GDP per capita9 or household income and may be a number that is more 
compelling to the average person or family. The GDP per capita cost in the 167 bmt scenario is 
provided in Table A5.10 A similar per capita calculation can be made for welfare or 
consumption. 
Costs per household are similar where instead of dividing by population one divides by the 
number of households (or by population and then multiply by average household size or for 
different assumed household sizes — family of four for instance). Table A6 provides a cost for a 
household with a family size of four and family size of 2.57 (an average U.S. household size in 
2005). A similar calculation for household welfare change can be made for households of 
different sizes. 
 
 
                                                 
9 This study focuses on the US. Sometimes there is an interest in comparing absolute costs among countries. For this 
reason it is important to consider the relative purchasing power of different currencies as market exchange rates 
are highly variable and can provide misleading indication of relative well-being among countries. To reflect 
differences in relative incomes among countries when incomes are expressed in common monetary units, several 
indexes can be constructed. The most popular is a purchasing-power parity (PPP) index. Conventionally in using 
these indices the U.S is set to 1.0, so per capita GDP measured at PPP or at market-exchange rates is the same. 
For other countries these two measures may differ. Although widely accepted estimates of current PPP rates are 
available, there is no standard method for projecting how they may change in the future. 
10 All the caveats about the GDP measure described in Section 4 are applied here as well. GDP calculation is 
provided here for illustrative purposes to compare with a popular measure of GDP per capita. As discussed 
above, welfare and consumption calculation is preferred. 
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Table A5. GDP per capita cost 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
Population (billion) 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.44 
Reference GDP (trillion 
2005$) 17.48 22.57 29.25 37.53 
Policy GDP (trillion 
2005$) 17.23 22.02 28.28 36.15 
Change in GDP from 
Reference (trillion 
2005$) -0.25 -0.55 -0.98 -1.39 
Reference Per capita 
GDP (2005$) 51271 60513 72050 85496 
Per capita GDP cost 
(2005$) 745 1480 2405 3160 
 
Table A6. Change in Household Consumption  
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
Reference Consumption 
(trillion 2005$) 11.83 15.16 19.59 25.09 
Policy Consumption 
(trillion 2005$) 11.70 14.82 18.95 24.22 
Change in Consumption 
(trillion 2005$) -0.13 -0.34 -0.64 -0.88 
Change in Consumption 
per family of 4 (2005$) -1565 -3635 -6279 -7983 
Change per U.S. 
Average Household 
Consumption (2005$) -1005 -2336 -4034 -5129 
 
6. Discounted Costs 
Climate policies are typically specified over a period of several years or even decades, and 
because the level of the policy is changing over time the costs are changing from year to year. To 
compare costs over time, conventional economic practices apply a discounts rate to future costs 
on the basis that money today would earn a return over time. One also may be interested in a 
summary measure of the cost to be borne over the life of the policy. A useful measure is thus the 
average annual discounted GDP, welfare, or consumption change either as a percentage, an 
aggregate total or per household. A key variable in this calculation is a discount rate, i.e., how 
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much less we value the future payments in comparison to the present payments of the same size, 
and there are different views on what the appropriate rate is for climate policy (see, for example, 
Nordhaus (2007) for a discussion about a discount rate). Table A7 provides the discounted 
household welfare to 2005 using a 4% discount rate, for the policy effects to 2050, for an 
average U.S. household. One can also calculate an average discounted welfare change for a 
certain period of time (which, for 2020-2050, is a reduction of $700 compared to an average 
discounted household welfare of about $44,000 in the 167 bmt scenario). A similar calculation 
for a discounted GDP and consumption change can be made. A related measure is a net present 
value (NPV) of welfare (consumption, GDP) or welfare change, where all variables are summed 
over a certain period and discounted to the present values. 
Table A7. Discounted household welfare change 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
Reference Welfare 
(trillion 2005$) 14.30 18.67 24.23 31.12 
Policy Welfare (trillion 
2005$) 14.21 18.38 23.67 30.33 
Change in Welfare 
(trillion 2005$) -0.09 -0.28 -0.56 -0.78 
Change per U.S. Average 
Household Welfare 
(2005$) -680 -1960 -3564 -4582 
Change per U.S. Average 
Household Welfare 
(2005$), discounted to 
2005 at 4 percent -378 -735 -903 -784 
7. Change in Energy Prices  
Prices of all goods will change in the economy as a result of climate policy and in response to 
these changes consumers will adjust their consumption of goods. Climate policy will have the 
strongest effect on energy prices as fossil-based fuels will have an additional charge due to their 
carbon content and that change in price can have strong effects on the demand for these fuels. As 
a result, there is often interest in how fuel and electricity prices will change. That said, it is 
important to note that changes in energy prices are not a cost in addition to those discussed above 
(welfare, GDP, consumption): to the extent fuel and electricity prices rises lead to an increase 
expenditure on energy by consumers or reduce the income and rents received by producers of 
energy, these effects are captured in broader measures of economic cost discussed above. CO2 
pricing will in general increase the wedge between the prices consumers pay (which includes the 
CO2 charge) and the price producers receive for fuels. Consumers will face higher CO2-inclusive 
prices for energy and reduce their demand for fossil fuels. This will tend to lower the producer 
price received for fuels. Table A8 provides energy prices in the reference (i.e., no climate 
policy) scenario, producer prices (exclusive of carbon charge), and consumer prices (inclusive of 
carbon charge) in the case of the 167 bmt policy. The consumer prices are calculated based on 
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the CO2 price and the carbon content of the fuel, here using factors from the US CCSP scenario 
study (see Table 4.7 in US CCSP, 2007). Electricity price effects depend on abatement costs and 
CO2 emissions from electricity which change significantly because the intent of the policy is to 
greatly reduce these emissions. EPPA models the impact on the electricity price directly. 
Table A8. Energy prices 
Natural Gas Price ($/tcf) Reference 
Policy 
Producer Price 
Policy 
Consumer Price 
2010 7.09 7.09 7.09 
2020 7.70 6.85 10.75 
2030 9.72 8.55 14.32 
2040 13.01 9.36 17.90 
2050 17.47 9.10 21.75 
Crude Oil price ($/bbl) Reference 
Policy 
Producer Price 
Policy 
Consumer Price 
2010 65.09 65.09 65.09 
2020 88.20 82.10 114.03 
2030 120.47 109.45 156.72 
2040 142.83 125.28 195.26 
2050 159.32 139.20 242.78 
Coal Price($/short ton) Reference 
Policy 
Producer Price 
Policy 
Consumer Price 
2010 32.23 32.23 32.23 
2020 34.00 31.17 175.93 
2030 35.70 30.67 244.95 
2040 37.59 31.13 348.31 
2050 39.71 32.06 501.56 
Electricity Price (c/kWh) Reference 
Policy 
Consumer Price 
2010 9.14   9.14 
2020 10.82   16.21 
2030 12.05   18.49 
2040 12.49   18.97 
2050 12.85   19.02 
 
 32
8. Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) 
A Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve is a relationship between tons of emissions abated 
and the CO2 (or GHG) price. Under highly simplified assumptions, the area under a MAC curve 
provides an estimate of total cost — but this is best seen as the direct cost of abatement 
undertaken in that year as it does not capture distortion costs and terms-of-trade effects among 
other economy-wide effects (for a discussion, see for example, Paltsev et al., 2004). MACs 
derived from the EPPA model are described in detail in Morris et al. (2008). Some studies show 
a negative part of MACs, like, for example McKinsey and Co analysis (2007), where “almost 40 
percent of abatement could be achieved at “negative” marginal costs”. Jacoby (1998) discusses 
some of the ways such bottom-up based engineering studies can be misleading as a guide to an 
economy-wide policy. For more on a comparison of EPPA and a McKinsey MAC curve, see 
Appendix B of the MIT Joint Program Report 164 (available at: 
http://globalchange.mit.edu/pubs/abstract.php?publication_id=972).  
In economy-wide modeling studies, zero cost or beneficial efficiency improvements are 
recognized through an exogenous energy efficiency improvement over time and so these are 
captured in the reference/no policy scenario. Thus, they do not appear as part of a policy scenario 
and, therefore, a MAC constructed from an economy-wide model generally does not have a 
negative cost component. However, in countries with positive terms-of-trade effects or if auction 
revenue is used to cut existing distortionary taxes, there can be welfare gains from climate policy 
even with a positive CO2 price, especially for smaller reductions (e.g., see Babiker et al., 2003). 
 
References for Appendix B 
Babiker, M., A. Gurgel, S. Paltsev, J. Reilly (2008), A Forward Looking Version of the MIT 
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model, MIT Joint Program on the Science 
and Policy of Global Change, Report 161, Cambridge, MA (available at: 
http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt161.pdf). 
Babiker, M., G. Metcalf, and J. Reilly (2003), Tax distortions and global climate policy, Journal 
of Economic and Environmental Management, 46: 269-287. 
Creyts, J., A. Derkach, S. Nyquist, K. Ostrowski, J. Stephenson (2007), Reducing U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: How Much at What Cost? McKinsey and Company (available 
at: http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pdf/US_ghg_final_report.pdf). 
Gurgel, A., S. Paltsev, J. Reilly, G. Metcalf (2007), U.S. Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade 
Proposals: Application of a Forward Looking Computable General Equilibrium Model, MIT 
Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 150, Cambridge, MA 
(available at: http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt150.pdf). 
EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] (2009), EPA Preliminary Analysis of the Waxman-
Markey Discussion Draft, Washington, DC (available at: 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/economicanalyses.html). 
 33
 34
Goulder, L. (2008), Economic Impacts of Environmental Policies, NBER Research Summary, 
http://www.nber.org/reporter/spring00/goulder.html. 
Jacoby, H. (1998), The Uses and Misuses of Technology Development as a Component of 
Climate Policy, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 43, 
Cambridge, MA (available at: 
http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt43.pdf). 
Morris, J., S. Paltsev, J. Reilly (2008), Marginal Abatement Costs and Marginal Welfare Costs 
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: Results from the EPPA model, MIT Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 164, Cambridge, MA 
(available at: http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt164.pdf). 
Nordhaus, W. (2007). A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3): 686-702. 
Paltsev, S., J. Reilly, H. Jacoby, K. Tay (2004), The Cost of Kyoto Protocol Targets: The Case of 
Japan, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 112, 
Cambridge, MA (available at: 
http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt112.pdf). 
Paltsev, S., J. Reilly, H. Jacoby, J. Morris (2009), The Cost of Climate Policy in the United 
States, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 173, 
Cambridge, MA (available at: 
http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt173.pdf). 
US CCSP [US Climate Change Science Program] (2007), U.S. Climate Change Science Program 
Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.1 a: Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Atmospheric Concentrations, L. Clark et al, Washington, DC (available at: 
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap2-1/default.html). 
